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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
'k'k'k'k'k'k'k'k

VELMA MARCHANT, ELMA WINTERTON,
LEORA ROBINSON, WANDA PENROD,
MONA LICHTY, MERLE ANDERSON,
Plaintiff-Appellants,
Case No. 870320
vs.
PARK CITY, a municipal corporation, and THE STATE OF UTAH
Defendants-Respondents.

* * * * * * * *

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS
PARK CITY MUNICIPAL CORPORATION &
STATE OF UTAH
'k-k'k'k'k'k'k'k

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Plaintiffs-appellants,

Velma

Marchant

and

others

(hereinafter collectively "Plaintiffs"), appeal from the judgment
of the Third Judicial District Court for Summit County, Utah, the
Honorable Leonard H. Russon presiding, entering judgment in favor
of

Defendants-respondents,

Park

City

Municipal

Corporation

(hereinafter "Park City") and the State of Utah

(hereinafter

"State"), quieting title to the subject property in the State and
dismissing with prejudice the complaint of Plaintiffs.

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT

Plaintiffs

commenced

this

action

in December, 1982

against Park City, seeking the subject property.

When Plaintiffs

later learned that Park City had previously conveyed the subject
property to the State,

they amended their complaint to also name

the State as a Defendant.
Prior

to the trial, the Court granted

Park City's

Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, dismissing Plaintiffs1 claim
to the property in question pursuant to the Doctrine of Boundary
by Acquiescence.

This Order was not appealed.

1987, trial was held without a jury.

On May 6 and 7,

On May 22, 1987, the Court

issued a Memorandum Decision directing Judgment to be entered in
favor of Park City and the State.
Court on July 8, 1987.

Judgment was entered by the

Plaintiffs Motion to Amend Findings of

Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment or in the alternative,
grant a new trial, was denied on August 19, 1987.
also not appealed.

This Order was

On September 8, 1987, Plaintiffs filed their

Notice of Appeal.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL

Park City and the State seek an Order of the Court
affirming the judgment of the District Court.

-2-
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STATEMENT OF FACTS

The statement of facts in the brief of Plaintiffs
misstates certain important facts and omits other material facts
upon which the Trial Court based its judgment, which dismissed
all of Plaintiffs claims to ownership or use of the property in
question.
1.

Subject Property, Title and Chain of Conveyances.

(a)

State's Chain of Title

The subject Property (which is the property described
in Plaintiffs1 complaint) is a parcel of real property in Summit
County located in Park City. The chain of title through which the
State claims ownership of the subject property is rooted in the
patent issued by the United States Government.

On April 5, 1882,

the United States issued a patent to George Snyder (Ex. 27), the
metes and bounds legal description of the patent undisputedly
encompasses the subject property

(Tr. 129-130) (Ex. 25).

The

patent on its face, shows that it was duly recorded in the
records of the Summit County Recorder (Ex. 27).
On

November

14,

1883,

George

Snyder

conveyed

by

Warranty Deed the portion of the patent real property (Ex. 28)
which without dispute includes the subject property (Tr. 131-132)
(Ex. 25) to the Park City Smelting Company.

This deed was also

duly recorded in the records of the Summit County Recorder (Ex.
28).
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On
conveyed

September

title

21, 1912, Park

to all of

City

its property

Smelting

in Summit

Company

County by

Indenture Deed to Lewis H. Withey and Clay H. Hollister (Ex. 29).
While this deed, unlike the previous deed, does not have a metes
and bounds

description, the deed

does

convey

M

all

the real

property or rights of interest in real property belonging to the
Park City Smelting Company and situated in the County of Summit,
Utah, whether the same is particularly described in this deed or
not11.

(Ex. 29) (Tr. 134)

This deed was also duly recorded in

the office of the Summit County Recorder.

(Ex.29)

On November 5, 1926, the executors of the Last Will of
Lewis H. Withey, deceased, a tenant

in common with Clay H.

Hollister, conveyed by Deed the property of Withey to Silver King
Coalition Mines Company.

(Ex. 30)

On February 5, 1927, Clay H. Hollister, a tenant in
common with Lewis H. Withey, conveyed by
personally,

and

all

interest

as

Trustee

deed his
for

the

interest

Park

City

Smelting Company in all real property in Summit County formerly
owned by Park City Smelting and owned at the time of conveyance
by Hollister to Silver King Coalition Mines Company through a
general grant clause.

This deed was duly recorded in the records

of the Summit County Recorder, as Entry No. 38097.

(Ex. 31)

On May 8, 1953, Silver King Coalition Mines Company
conveyed by deed the subject property to United Park City Mines
Company. (Ex. 32)

The deed contains a locatable metes and bounds

description which undisputedly
(Ex. 32) (Ex. 25) (Tr. 147)

includes the subject property.

As all other deeds in Defendants1
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chain of title, this deed was duly recorded in the records of the
Summit County Recorder (Ex. 32).
On April 2, 1969, United Park City Mines Company
conveyed certain real property described by a metes and bounds
description to Park City by Deed (Ex. 33). The description in
this deed contains a locatable legal description which, without
dispute, encompasses the subject property (Ex. 33), (Ex. 25) (Tr.
149).

This deed was also duly recorded in the records of the

Summit County Recorder (Ex. 33).

Park City provided valuable

consideration to United Park City Mines Company for the subject
property by exchanging real property for the subject property
(Ex. 36)
On June 7, 1982, Park City conveyed the subject
property to the State (Ex. 34).
description

of

metes

and

This deed contained a legal

bounds

which,

without

dispute,

encompasses the subject property (Ex. 34), (Ex. 25) (Tr. 149,
150).
(b) Plaintiffs' Deeds.

The Plaintiffs offered four deeds (Ex. 4, 5, 6, 7) as
evidence of their claimed chain of title.

The deeds are as

follows:
On March 19, 1906, Dan McPolin and Belle McPolin quit
claimed any interest they might have in a "certain one story,
frame, three roomed dwelling house situated on the easterly side
of Silver Creek and about one hundred feet easterly of the Summit
Lumber Company11 to Jesse McCarrel (Ex. 4).
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On June 10, 1914 Summit County quit claimed any
interest it might have in "improvements east U. C. Tracks, Park
City, Utah to William Rolph (Ex, 5).
On June 21, 1917, Summit County quit claimed any
interest it might have in "that certain frame dwelling house by
lumber yard

in Park

City, Summit

County, Utah, assessed to

William Rolfe in the year 1912 (Ex. 6).
On June 13, 1962, Summit County issued a tax deed to
Charles Rolfe for "house in lumber yard" (Ex. 7).
None of the deeds of Plaintiffs contained any locatable
legal description or even a street address.

All of the deeds of

Plaintiffs, except one, are quit claim deeds.

Plaintiffs1 deeds

were admitted pursuant to a stipulation they were authentic but
subject to determination by the Court as to what, if anything,
the deeds conveyed (Tr. 30-32) (R. 302-303)

2.

Extrinsic Evidence Regarding Deeds.

Plaintiffs did not introduce any extrinsic evidence
regarding the deeds dated 1906, 1914, 1917 (Ex. 4, 5, 6) except
that said deeds were found among family and legal papers (Tr. 34,
36).

There was no evidence as to the location of the property

the deeds were referring to, the location of the lumber yard or
the U. C. Tracks in relationship to the subject property.
The County Auditor, Reed Pace,

who executed the 1963

deed (Ex. 7) on behalf of Summit County and was Summit County
Treasurer from 1954 to 1962 and Clerk/Auditor from 1954 to 1986,
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testified that the 1963 tax deed executed by him was a deed
solely to improvements to real property and not a deed to real
property (Tr. 184-186), and that Charles Rolfe, the grantee, had
purposely not paid taxes on the same improvements in order to
obtain a deed from Summit County and strengthen his claim of
title.

(Tr. 183-184)
Mr.

Pace

also

testified

that he had

examined

the

records of Summit County back to the early 1900fs (Tr. 179), and
that the practice of Summit County, both in the present and past,
was to issue a quit claim deed for property which was not
purchased at a tax sale.

(Tr. 193)

Mr. Pace further testified

that he had no knowledge of the location of the house referred to
in the 1963 deed.

(Ex. 7) (Tr. 186)

Both Mr. Pace and Deputy Summit County Assessor Steven
Martin, who also had reviewed the records of Summit County (Tr.
200), testified that it was a common practice for Summit County,
both currently and in the past, to assess real property and
improvements constructed upon the real property separately if the
improvements and underlying property were separately owned.
179-180, 200-201)

(Tr.

Mr. Pace also testified that if taxes became

delinquent on the separately

owned

improvements, it was the

practice of Summit County to treat the improvements like real
property and sell the improvements at tax sale and issue a tax
deed.

(Tr. 189-190)

If the improvements were not purchased at

the tax sale, the County would later sell the improvements and
issue a quit claim deed.

(Tr. 193-194)
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Mr. Pace also testified that when improvements were
sold at the tax sale, the intent of of Summit County was to
convey

only

property.

the

improvements

and

not

the

underlying

real

(Tr. 182)

3. Possession and Abandonment of Subject Property by
Plaintiffs.
The first fixed date of possession by the Plaintiffs1
claimed predecessors was 1925 (Tr. 30), according to testimony by
All possession by Plaintiffs1 claimed predecessors

Plaintiffs.

ceased when the shack was abandoned in approximately 1964.

(Tr.

66-67)

Plaintiffs never possessed the subject property.

(Tr.

65-66)

From 1964 until this action was brought in 1982, the

subject property was abandoned. The shack was vacant and appeared
to be abandoned, the yard was unkempt and over-grown with weeds
and there was no discernible property use according to all four
witnesses, including one of the Plaintiffs, who testified to have
observed it.
Park
building
testified

(Tr. 66-67; 109-110; 217-218; Vol. 2 p. 6)
City

inspector
that when

Building

Official

with

years

he

23

inspected

Ron

Ivie, a certified

experience
the

shack

on

(Tr.

108-9),

the

subject

property in 1981, it appeared abandoned and did not appear as
though someone was attempting to re-habilitate it.

(Tr. 109-110)

4. Taxation of Subject Property.
Until the subject property was acquired by Park City in
1969 and became tax-exempt, it was subject to assessment for real

-8-
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property taxes.

Deputy Summit County Assessor, Steven Martin,

testified that according to the records of the Summit County
Assessor's Office, beginning in 1931, the subject property could
be

identified

description.

in

the

tax

records

by

a

locatable

legal

Prior to 1931, the Summit County Assessor's records

do not contain a locatable legal description for the subject
property.

(Tr. 208)

A summary of the County Assessor's records

was admitted at trial. (Ex.43)

The summary and testimony of Mr.

Martin showed that from 1931 to 1936 taxes for a parcel of real
property which undisputedly includes the subject property were
assessed to the State's predecessor in interest, Silver King
Coalition Mines Company, and that the assessment was for the real
property and no taxes were assessed for improvements, and that
said taxes were paid.

(Tr. 203-4) (Ex. 43) (Ex. 25)

The testimony and exhibits show that from 1937 to 1953
under

a

slightly

different

legal

description

which

also

undisputedly encompassed the subject property, the real property
taxes on the subject property were also assessed to Silver King
Coalition Mines Company and that such real property taxes were
paid every year.

(Tr. 204-5) (Ex. 43) (Ex. 25)

Mr. Martin's testimony was also that from 1954 to 1969,
real property taxes on the subject property were assessed to
State's

predecessor

United

Park

City Mines

Company

under a

slightly different legal description which also encompassed the
subject property and were also paid every year.
206)

(Ex. 43) (Tr.

In 1951, Summit County assigned tax identification numbers

to parcels of real property.

The subject property was assigned

-9-

the number SA-400.

(Tr. 206)

From 1969 to the present, no taxes

were paid on the subject property because of its ownership by
Park City from 1969-1982 and the State from 1982 to the present
(Tr. 206).
Ed Osika, Vice President, Secretary-Treasurer of United
Park City Mines Company testified that according to the records
of United Park City Mines Company, it paid the real property
taxes assessed to the United Park City Mines Company against the
subject property for the year 1953-1969. (Tr. 167-169)

Records

of such tax payment were admitted as Exhibit 35.
The only

evidence of payment

of any

taxes by the

Plaintiffs or any of their predecessors was the testimony of
Plaintiff, Merle Anderson, that she or her mother paid taxes.
When asked what years she had knowledge of payment of taxes the
only years she had knowledge of were 1982 and two years prior to
1982 (Tr. 69) and she had no knowledge of payment of taxes prior
to 1966

(Tr. 70).

The Plaintiffs

introduced

no

records or

testimony from the Summit County Assessor's office and Deputy
Assessor, Steve Martin, testified that he had no knowledge of any
payment of taxes by the Plaintiffs or their predecessors. (Tr.
212).
The

quit

claim

deeds

which

Plaintiffs

claim

show

payment of taxes (Ex. 5, 6) do not establish payment of any
taxes.
A

letter

from

Reed

Pace

(Ex.

13), Summit

County

Treasurer, reveals that Plaintiffs1 predecessors paid no taxes
from 1940-1954.
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Plaintiffs introduced no evidence which could tie any
of the scattered and infrequent tax payments to the subject
property and it would be pure speculation as to any relationship
between

the

subject

property

and

Plaintiffs1

claimed

tax

payments.

5.

Destruction of Shack on Subject Property.

No

evidence

involvement

was

admitted

in the destruction

of

that
the

Park

City

had

any

shack on the subject

property other than to issue a demolition permit to a third
party.

No claim for the destruction of the shack was made

against the State of Utah.
The

employee

(Tr. Vol. 2 P. 14)

of Park

tearing down dangerous

City who

is responsible

for

structures which are public nuisances

testified that Park City did not tear down the shack on the
subject property (Tr. 198). The Chief Building Official, who was
called

as

a witness

for

the

Plaintiffs,

testified

that

a

demolition permit for the shack on the subject property was
issued to a third party (Ex. 38) (Tr. 94) and that the shack to
be demolished was identified to him by a photograph since street
names and addresses were uncertain in that area of Park City (TR.
103-105) (Ex. 39, 40) and the shack was demolished to the best of
his knowledge by Lloyd

Brothers Construction, which was not

working for Park City and was employed by a third party (Tr. 93).
The procedure

for

issuance

of a demolition permit

does not

require the applicant to prove ownership of the property (Tr.
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96), but is issued upon the signature of the applicant that the
applicant has the right to demolish the structure•

The Building

Official testified that he never ordered the destruction of the
shack on the subject property (Tr. 103), that he is not aware of
all properties owned by Park City (Tr. 107), and believed at that
time that Deer Valley owned the shack on the subject property and
could legally demolish it, (Tr, 106)
Ross

Lloyd,

one

of

the

owners

of

Lloyd

Brothers

Construction, testified that he was familiar with the demolition
of the shack on the subject property (Tr. Vol. 2 Pg. 2). Mr.
Lloyd

testified

that Lloyd Brothers Construction

installed a

water line through the subject property for Deer Valley and that
Deer Valley ordered the shack on the subject property demolished.
(Tr. Vol. 2 p.4)

ARGUMENT
POINT I
PLAINTIFFS ARE BARRED BY GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY

When this action was originally brought against only
Park City, the Answer filed by Park City set forth that the owner
of the subject property, the State, was an indispensible party
and

the

action

could

not

proceed

unless

indispensible party was properly joined.

the

State

as

an

The Plaintiffs failed

to properly join the State.
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<

In order

to bring

this

action

against

the State,

Plaintiffs must comply with the Utah Governmental Immunity Act,
Utah Code Annotated § 63-30-1, et. seq., 1953, as amended.
Pursuant to § 63-30-12, Utah Code Annotated,

notice

of

claim against the State must be filed within one year after the
claim arose and failure to timely and properly file notice of
claim by the Plaintiffs bars this action.
In Ash v. State, 572 P.2d 1374, 1376-80 (Utah 1977) the
Utah Supreme Court indicated that the Utah Governmental Immunity
Act was applicable to quiet title actions involving the State and
that those bringing quiet title actions against the State must
file timely notice of claim within one year of the arising of the
cause of action.
No claim was filed against the State at any time.
Thus, no

action

could

be brought

against

the

State

(which

preserved the defense of governmental immunity in its Amended
Answer), to recover the subject property from the State.

The

Trial Court properly ruled that the Plaintiffs were barred for
failing to properly file a claim against the State.

Thus, this

Court should uphold the ruling of the Trial Court and dismiss
this action since an the State, an indispensible party, was never
properly joined and Plaintiffs claim for relief against the State
is barred.

See Yates v. Vernal Family Health Center 617 P.2d 532 (Utah
1980); and Scarborough v. Granite School Dist. 531 P.2d 480 (Utah
1975)
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POINT II
BURDEN OF PROOF AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

In order to prevail in a quiet title action the moving
party must succeed on the strength of its own title to the
subject

property

and

opposing party's title.

cannot

rely

only

on weaknesses

in the

This essential element of quiet title is

cited in no fewer than six Utah Supreme Court decisions since
1967.2
Plaintiffs, without setting forth which of the Trial
Court's

factual

findings

they

claim

to

be

erroneous, have

submitted a statement of facts which selectively sets forth only
those facts which they believe support their case.

In Bennion v.

Hansen, 699 P.2d 757, 759 (Utah 1985), the Supreme Court held:
In reviewing the evidence, we view it in the
light most favorable to the trial court...the
Brother's Counsel has not approached this appeal
with these standards in mind. His brief ignores
the Trial Court's findings and invites this Court
to reweigh all the evidence on the issue and
independently find the facts. That is not this
Court's role, and we firmly decline the brother's
invitation. (Citation omitted)
The Plaintiffs in the instant matter are also inviting
the Appellate Court to reweigh the evidence and independently
find the facts.

This invitation must again be firmly denied.

See Music Service Corporation v. Walton, 432 P.2d 334, 20
Utah 2d 16 (1967); Smith v. Detfliro, 486 ?.2d 1036, 26 Utah 153
(1971); Olsen v. Park Daughters Investment Co. 511 P.2d 145, 29
Utah 2d 421 (1973); Colman v. Butkovich, 538 P.~2d 188 (Utah 1975);
Ash v. State, 572 P.2d TT7% (Utah T977); Church v. Meadows
Springs Ranch, Inc., 659 P.2d 1045 (Utah 1983)
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i

The proper standard of review requires the Appellate
Court to not disturb the findings of the Trial Court if there is
substantial evidence in the record to support them.
759.

Also the evidence must be reviewed

Bennion at

in the light most

favorable to the judgment of the Trial Court.

(City Electric v.

Industrial Indem Co., 683 P.2d 1053, 1059-60 (Utah 1984), Ash v.
State, 572P.2d 1374 (1977)).
the evidence, the Appellate

Moreover if there is a conflict in
Court must

"defer

to the Trial

Court's first-hand assessment of the witnesses1 credibility and
assume

that

the Trial

Court believed

those

aspects

of

the

evidence which support its findings11. ( Hal Taylor Associates, v.
Union America, Inc., 657 P.2d 743, 749 (Utah 1982)).
As is shown in the extensive statement of facts in this
brief, in the record itself and the facts found by the Trial
Court in its memorandum decision (Rec. 368-373) and Findings of
Fact (Rec. 378-385) entered with the judgment are supported by
substantial facts and should be upheld by this Court.

POINT III
PLAINTIFFS FAILED TO PROVE ADVERSE POSSESSION

The Plaintiffs claim the subject property by Adverse
Possession under Utah Code Annotated § 78-12-10 et. seq.

In

order to obtain the subject real property by Adverse Possession,
the Plaintiffs must prove that they have complied precisely with
all of the requirements for adverse possession found in Utah Code
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Annotated § 78-12-10, et. seq. , 1954 as amended. The Court in
Home Owners1 Loan Corporation v. Dudley, 141 P.2d 160, 166 (Utah
1943) held that the party claiming adverse possession

,f

has the

burden of pleading and proving full compliance with the statute."
This holding was reaffirmed in Neeley v. Kelsch, 600 P. 2d 979
(Utah 1979), and most recently in United Park City Mines Co, v.
Estate of Clegg, 737 P. 2d 173

(Utah, 1987) where the Court

held:lf0ne who seeks to acquire title to real property other than
by

conveyance

must

comply

requirements for doing so."

precisely

with

the

statutory

(Emphasis added.)

The statutory elements of Adverse Possession are:
1.

Possess land in the statutorily prescribed manner,
for the statutory period of seven years;

2.

Hold the land adversely to title holder;

3.

Pay all taxes legally assessed against the land
for the seven year period.
i

It is only required that Plaintiffs1 fail to comply precisely
with the statutory requirements of a single element to have their
claim of adverse possession fail completely.

A. PLAINTIFFS CANNOT SHOW PAYMENT OF ALL TAXES LEGALLY
ASSESSED AGAINST THE LAND FOR ANY SEVEN YEAR PERIOD.

Utah

Code

Annotated

§

78-12-12, 1953

as

amended,

requires that Mthe party, his predecessors and grantors have paid
all taxes which have been levied and assessed upon such land

i

according to law.11 (emphasis added)
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i

The Utah Supreme Court has consistently held that the
requirement of payment of all taxes is a mandatory requirement,
which if not proven by the party claiming adverse possession,
will defeat his claim.

The Court explained this requirement in

its ruling in Home Owners' Loan Corporation v. Dudley, 141 P. 2d
160, 166 (Utah 1943), stating:
of

pleading

and

proving

"An adverse claimant has the duty

full

compliance

with

the
3
including payment of all taxes lawfully assessed....11

statute,

Prior to 1931, no evidence of payment of taxes was
available.

Deputy

Summit

County

Assessor

Steven Martin was

unable to locate records of payment of taxes on the subject
property.

The two quit claim deeds issued by Summit County (Ex.

5, 6), which Plaintiffs cite as proof of tax payment, only recite
that
There

consideration
was

no

paid was

evidence

$28.68 and

that

such

$1.00, respectively.

consideration

relationship whatsoever to any taxes assessed.

had

any

There was no

evidence as to what years of taxes the consideration represented.
The deeds are entitled Quit Claim deeds, probably issued after a
tax sale found no buyers.

Plaintiffs' claim that issuance of

such deeds "unequivocally" proves payment of all taxes for the
pre-1931 period is incredible and contrary to settled Utah law.
In Bowen v. Olsen
ruled

that

2 Utah 2d 12, 268 P2d 983 (1954), the Court

redeeming

property

at

a

tax

sale

or

purchasing

property at a tax sale does not constitute the payment of taxes

See also Neeley v. Kelsch, 600 P.2d 979 (Utah 1979)
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necessary to comply with the statutory requirement for adverse
possession.

Thus any redemption or purchase from Summit County

by Plaintiffs' predecessors could not satisfy the requirement
that taxes be paid for seven years by the party claiming adverse
possession. 4
From 1931 to 1969, the State's predecessors and not the
Plaintiffs' predecessors paid all real property taxes on the
subject property from 1931 to 1969.

A letter from then County

Treasurer Reed Pace, dated May 16, 1957, (Ex. 13) reveals that
Plaintiff's predecessor did not pay any taxes whatsoever for the
period of 1940-1955 and Plaintiffs themselves admitted to no
knowledge of payment of any taxes prior to 1966 and only claimed
payment in 1982 and two other years before 1982 and after 1966.
Thus, at trial Plaintiffs failed to show payment of all
taxes assessed for any seven year period, failing to meet the
requirements of Utah Code Annotated § 78-12-12, 1953, as amended.
In Neeley v. Kelsch, 600 P2d 979, 982 (Utah 1979), the Supreme
Court held:
This Court has held an adverse claimant has the
burden of proving full statutory compliance,
including the payment of all taxes assessed.
Kelsch testified that he did not know whether or
not he had paid taxes on the disputed property,
and he did not present any evidence of the payment
of taxes. Since Kelsch did not carry his burden
of proof, the Trial Court erred in holding adverse
possession as an alternative basis for Quieting
Title in Kelsch.

.See also Aggelos v. Zella Mining Co. , 107 P.2d 170 (Utah
1940), where the Supreme Court also held that redemption at a tax
(Footnote Continued)
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Parkwest Village v. Avise, 714 P.2d 1137 (Utah 1986),
which is relied upon by Plaintiffs, is distinguishable from the
instant matter and totally inapplicable.

In Avise, the Court

ruled

pay

that

improvement

if the
owner's

land holder
payment

of

did not
taxes

for

sufficient for adverse possession purposes.

any
seven

taxes, the
years

is

There is no holding

or suggestion in Avise that the Adverse Possessor is relieved
from his duty to prove payment of all taxes for seven consecutive
years.
Clearly the failure by the Plaintiffs to prove payment
of all taxes for any seven year period precludes them from
obtaining the subject property by adverse possession.
Even if Plaintiff could show payment of taxes for the
required seven year period, the enunciated purpose behind the
requirement of payment of all taxes by the party claiming adverse
possession is to put the true owner on notice that his land is
being adversely claimed.

This purpose is stated in Bowen v.

Olson, 2 Utah 2d 12, 268 P.2d 983 (1954).

In the instant matter,

there is no identifiable location of the improvements on which
Plaintiffs

claimed

to have paid

taxes.

The absence of any

description sufficient to locate the improvements assessed is
insufficient to put the State or its predecessors on notice of
any adverse claim as required by Bowen.

(Footnote Continued)
sale did not constitute payment of taxes required under adverse
possession.
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B. PLAINTIFFS DID NOT POSSESS THE SUBJECT PROPERTY
AFTER 1964

The requirements for establishment of "possession" depend on
whether the adverse claimant is claiming under color of title or
not.

Color of title is not necessary, but it makes the element

of possession easier to meet for the adverse claimant.

Claiming

under color of title also affects the amount of land which can be
secured by possessory activities.
Plaintiffs, through their complaint, have not claimed
Adverse Possession under color of title, but only claimed under
the non-color of title section.

(See Paragraph 8 of Plaintiff's

Amended Complaint (Rec. 13)
Plaintiffs,
title, may

establish

as

adverse

possession

claimants
only

without

through

the

color

of

possessory

activities found in Utah Code Annotated § 78-12-11 (this Section
has been in effect and remains substantially
1872);

unchanged since

The adverse claimant without color of title can thus only

acquire the land actually
irrigated.

inclosed, cultivated, improved, or

The statutory language allows claiming "the land so

actually occupied and no other, is deemed to have been held
adversely."

Utah Code Annotated § 78-12-10, 1953 as amended.

The adverse claimant without color of title does not have the
benefit of the statutory section applicable to those who claim
with color of title which reads:
Where a known farm of single lot has been partly
improved, the portion of such farm or lot that
may have been left not cleared or not inclosed
according to the usual course and custom of the
adjoining county is deemed to have been occupied

for the same length of time as the part improved
and cultivated. Utah Code Annotated § 78-12-9(4),
1953 as amended.
Since 1964, Plaintiffs have failed to reach the minimum
threshold of possession under either color or non-color of title.
The testimony at trial, upon which the Court ruled the property
was abandoned, was that Plaintiffs neither lived in or rented the
property and only occasionally visited the property allowing it
to deteriorate and become overgrown with brush and weeds.

There

were no fences or defined yard and no sign of any cultivation or
improvements.

Additionally, the activities of Plaintiffs failed

to, "give actual or constructive

notice

to the

legal title

holder...[sufficient] to give a reasonably prudent title holder
notice of the claimant's intention.ff
585, 587 (Utah 1982).

Olwell v. Clark, 658 P. 2d

In order for conduct alone to give such

notice, "it must be conduct that is inconsistent with the rights
of the owner.11

Olwell at 587.

In Pender v. Jackson, 123 Utah

501, 260 P. 2d 542, (1953) the Utah Supreme Court ruled that
holding land for speculation was not a use sufficient to meet the
requirements of adverse possession.

The Court stated:

Merely holding land for speculation is the purpose
for which the land is held and not use of the land;
we are not disposed to distort the phrase "ordinary
use of the occupant" to a point beyond meaning.
This is true even though a landowner is cognizant
of the facts and the adverse claim became the
necessary element of occupation, as defined by
the Utah Statute, is not established.

See also Dillman v. Foster, 656 P.2d 974, 980 (Utah 1982)
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The Court in Pender cited with approval its earlier
decision in Day v. Steele, 111 Utah 481, 184 P.2d 216 (1947)
where surveying of the property erecting tie posts in corners,
clearing greasewood from the property, placing a sign on the
property, allowing a carnival to use a small portion of the
property for a week, and placing fill dirt on the property were
all cumulatively held to be insufficient to possess the property
under the lesser standard of the color of title statute.
The possessory activities must continuously be of the
character necessary under

§ 78-12-9 or § 78-12-11.

The adverse

claimant need not occupy the land constantly in order to occupy
it "continuously11, but the adverse claimant's possession may not
be sporadic.

In determining what is "continuous" and what is

"sporadic" the character of the land and the type of use to which
it is being put are important.

In the instant matter with the

residential nature of the property at issue, the complete failure
to occupy the property since 1964 destroys Plaintiffs1 ability to
claim ripening of adverse possession during this period.

C. PLAINTIFFS' USE OF THE REAL PROPERTY WAS PERMISSIVE
NOT ADVERSE

In

Utah,

"[t]o

acquire

title

by

adverse

possession...the possession [must be] with an intention on the
part of the claimant to claim title as owner and against the

See also Powell on Real Property, § 1018, pg 739
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rights of the true owner.1

Since intent is generally unstated,

it must be inferred from the possessory acts.
claim title will be inferred

The intent to

fl

[w]henever the possession is of
Q

such a character that ownership may be inferred.11
In the instant matter, the testimony trial was that it
was a common practice of mining companies in Park City to permit
the

use

of

their

property.

The Defendants

predecessors

in

interest, Silver King Coalition Mines (1927-1953) and United Park
City Mine Company (1953-1969), both permitted the use of their
property, including the subject property, by employees and others
to erect homes and live there (Tr. 174), the 1906 deed (Ex. 4) by
which Plaintiffs claim title, recognizes the permissive use of
the underlying real property by referring to "privileges" in the
land.

Plaintiffs introduced no evidence that the use of the

subject property by their predecessor was adverse rather than
permissive.
Once it is established the use was initially permissive
the inference and burden of proof of the adverse nature of the
use shifts back to the adverse claimant to show that the use
somehow became adverse.

In Richens v. Struhs, 412, P.2d 314 17

Utah 2d 356 (1966) the shifting of the burden is enunciated.

The

Court reasoned that unless the person claiming adverse possession

Montgomery Adverse Possession of Land Titles in Utah 3 Utah
Law Review 294, at 309 (quoting Dignan v. Nelson, 72 P. 936, 937
(Utah 1903))
Q

Montgomery at 309 (quoting Pioneer Investment & Trust Co.
v. Board of Education, 99 P. 150, 152 (Utah 1909))
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could show that the use became adverse he would be allowed to
lf

sneak up on the owner by using his property under permission and

then after a lapse of time claim he was using it as a matter of
right" (at 316).

Plaintiffs1 claim of adverse possession falls

precisely into the category of behavior proscribed by Richins.

POINT IV
THE APPLICABLE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS BARS PLAINTIFFS

In order
property

to bring

the person bringing

an action

for recovery

of real

the actions must be seized or

possessed of the property within seven years of the commencement
of the action.

This statute of limitation is found at § 78-12-5

Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended, which states:
No action for the recovery of real property or for the
possession thereof shall be maintained, unless it
appears that the plaintiff, his ancestor, grantor or
predecessor was seized or possessed of the property in
question within seven years before the commencement of
the action.
The Trial Court correctly ruled that Plaintiffs were
barred by this statute of limitations since at the trial they
failed to show possession within seven years of commencement of
the action.

POINT V
THE SPECIAL TAX TITLE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS IS INAPPLICABLE
Plaintiffs, who never claimed a tax title in their
Amended Complaint (Rec. 12-15), now contend on appeal that the
deeds issued in 1914, 1917 and 1963 by Summit County (Ex. 5, 6,
-24-

7), are entitled to the special protections for tax titles found
in Utah Code Annotated § 78-12-5.1, § 78-12-5.2 and § 78-12-5.3
1953 as amended.

This argument is totally without merit.

The Plaintiff's predecessors in 1914, 1917 and 1963
were attempting to misuse the property taxation and enforcement
system to boot strap themselves into a title by failing to pay
taxes.

The Plaintiffs claim that their predecessors became the

owner of the subject property pursuant to the 1906 deed (Ex. 4).
The

1917

deed

on

its

face

states

that

the taxes had been

previously assessed in 1912 to William Rolfe, the Grantee, (Ex.
6) who obviously owed taxes prior to 1914 and failed to pay them.
The testimony of retired County Treasurer Reed Pace, who executed
the 1963 deed, (Ex. 7) was that Charles Rolfe, the Grantee, was
the person who owed the taxes on the "house in lumberyard11 for
which the 1963 tax deed was conveyed and purposely failed and
refused to pay the taxes in order to obtain a tax deed to the
house in the lumber yard.
The Plaintiffs are urging this Court to rule that those
who fail to pay their taxes should be rewarded with the special
statutory protection of third parties who purchase at tax sale.
The Supreme Court of Utah has already rejected this spurious
argument.

In Dillman v. Foster, 656 P2d 974 (Utah 1982), the

Court held that:

"One who is under an obligation to pay taxes on

land cannot be allowed to strengthen his title to such land by
buying

in

the

tax

title

when

the

property

is

consequence of his omission to pay taxes11, (at 979).
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sold

as a

The Court

in Dillman

refused

to apply

the special

statutes of limitations found in § 78-12-5-1, § 78-12-5.2 and
9
§78-12-5.3., and also held that those who were legally obligated
to pay taxes obtained nothing at the tax sale except release of
the lien imposed by the County for failure to pay their taxes.
The

rule

in Dillman

prevents

exactly

the

type of

activity engaged in by Plaintiffs1 claimed predecessors that of
attempting to clothe themselves with a title by willfully failing
to pay property taxes.
Secondly, in 1983, the United States Supreme Court in
Mennonite Board of Missions v. Adams, 462 U. S. 791 (1983) ruled
that a tax foreclosure and sale was void for denial of due
process of law if all lienholders did not receive actual prior
notice of the foreclosure proceeding.

In applying this holding

to a situation identical to the instant action, the Third Circuit
held in Benoit v. Pathaky, 780 F.2d 336 (3rd Cir. 1985), that
failure

to

give

consitutionally

sufficient

notice

was

a

jurisdictional defect which rendered inapplicable the special tax
title statute of limitations.
In

the

instant

matter,

what

notice

or

what

tax

foreclosure proceedings, if any was given at the turn of the
century,

is

unknown.

However,

it

is

clear

that

State's

predecessor and grantor, United Park City Mines Company, had no

The Utah Supreme Court also refused to apply the special
statute of limitations for tax titles in a situation where one
tenant in common ahd obtained a tax deed in Massey v. Prothero,
664 P.2d 1176 (Utah 1982)
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notice of any tax sale in 1963 which would affect its title since
it paid property

taxes on the underlying real property both

before and after the issuance of the 1963 tax deed.
Even if, arguendo, the deeds which Plaintiffs claim are
shielded by virtue of the special statute of limitations for tax
titles, the unassailable title is to improvements only since that
is all the deeds convey by their descriptions.

According to

Harman v. Polter, 592 P.2d 653 (Utah 1979), the description in a
deed is prima facie evidence of the intent of the grantor.

There

is no evidence which would rebut the prima facie evidence that
Summit County only intended to convey improvements by the deeds
issued by them.
POINT VII
MARKETABLE TITLE ACT VESTS PROPERTY IN
PLAINTIFFS NOT DEFENDANTS
The Plaintiffs in Point III of their brief wrongly
claim that the marketable title act operates to vest title in
them.

Plaintiffs are ignoring the requirement in the Act, found

in §57-9-1, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, that the
recorded conveyances relied upon must either create an interest
in, "(1) the person claiming such interest, or (2) some other
person from whom, by one or more conveyances or other title
transactions of record, such purported interest has become vested
in the person claiming such interest..."(emphasis added).
The Act clearly and unequivocally requires that the
root of the unbroken chain of title in excess of forty years
contain a chain of recorded conveyances to the person claiming
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protection

under

the Marketable

Title Act.

The root deed

Plaintiffs claim is a conveyance to a William Rolfe.

There are

no subsequent conveyances from William Rolfe to anyone else,
including the Plaintiffs.

Plaintiffs clearly cannot meet the

requirement of §57-9-1, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, and
thus cannot claim the benefits and protections of the Marketable
Title Act.
On the other hand, State's chain of title does meet the
requirements for protection under the Marketable Title Act.

The

chain of title through which Defendant State of Utah claims title
is an unbroken chain extending back to the Patent issued in 1882.
The conveyance from Clay H. Hollister to Silver King Coalition
Mines Company in 1927 would satisfy the requirements of the Act
and serve to vest title free and clear of the prior conveyances
claimed by Plaintiffs, pursuant to §57-9-3, Utah Code Annotated,
1953 as amended.

POINT VIII
THE DOCTRINE OF PRESCRIPTIVE EASEMENT
IS INAPPLICABLE AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO ADVERSE
POSSESSION
Plaintiffs have sought a prescriptive easement covering the
entire

subject

property.

This

claim

is

extremely

novel.

Plaintiffs would have this Court rule that if a person seeking
adverse possession fails to establish all of the elements for

See Swenson, The Utah Marketable Title Act, 8 Utah L. Rev.
205-206, 1963
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(

adverse possession, he may

obtain

all of the attributes of

ownership by prescriptive easement.

In other words, Plaintiffs

are

attempting

to

gain

title

to

the

subject

property

prescriptively without proving all of the elements necessary to
gain title by adverse possession.

An easement of the scope

claimed by Plaintiffs is actually not an easement at all; it is a
fee simple interest
An easement, as distinguished from ownership, is a mere
right to use the land of another for a limited purpose.

The Utah

Supreme Court has described the interlocking interests of owner
and easement holder created by the existence of an easement in
the following terms:
Whenever there is ownership of property subject
to an easement there is a dichotomy of interests,
both of which must be represented and kept in
balance. On the one hand, it is to be realized that
the owner of the fee title, because of his general
ownership, should have the use and enjoyment of his
property to the highest degree possible, not
inconsistent with the easement. On the other, the
owner of the easement should likewise have the right to
use and enjoy his easement to the fullest extent
possible not inconsistent with the rights of the fee
owner.
North Union Canal Company v. Newell, 550 P.2d 178, 179 (Utah
1976) (citations omitted).

This formulation of balanced rights

assumes that the owner of the servient tenement retains some
rights in the land.

The extent of the "easement" claimed by

Plaintiffs leaves no rights to the fee owner, the State.

x

See also United States v. 0'Block, 788 F2d 1433 (10th Cir.

1986)
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The concept of "easement" clearly addresses use, as
distinguished from occupation and enjoyment of land.

While the

Utah Supreme Court has not yet had an opportunity to rule on the
nature of this distinction, the distinction has been recognized
by

Courts

throughout

the

nation, for

example, the

Illinois

Supreme Court observed:
There are... rights to be exercised in connection with
corporal things but without any ownership, possession,
control or power of disposition of the thing in
connection with which the power may be exercised and
without any profit therein, such as a right to pass
over another's land;...These are easements which
consist in the right of the owner of one parcel of
land, by reason of such ownership, to use the land of
another for a special purpose not inconsistent with the
general property in the owner, and there are always
distinct from the occupation and enjoyment of the land
itself, [citations omitted]. A distinguishing feature
of an easement is the absence of all right to
participate in the profits of the soil charged with it.
[citations omitted.]
Transcontinental Oil Co. v. Emmerson, 131 N.E. 645, 648 (111.
1921).
Our neighboring jurisdiction of Colorado described the
limits of the extent of easement rights as follows:

lf

[W]hile

plaintiff had obtained an easement by prescription, it had not
acquired title to the land over which it flows.

The easement,

therefor, should not work a dispossession of the landowner."
Osborn & Claywood Ditch Co. v. Green, 673 P.2d 380, 382 (Colo.
1983) (emphasis added). 12

12
The West Virginia and Missouri Courts are also in accord.
See Ballanges v. Beckley Coal & Supply Co., 161 S. E. 562, 563
(W. Viu 19J1) ; and St. Louis County v. St. Appalonia Corp. , 471
S. W. 2d 238, 246 (Mo. 1971)
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Plaintiffs1
property

is

claimed

essentially

"easement"

inconsistent

over

the

with both

subject

the "general

ownership," (North Union Canal at 179), of the fee owner and the
"use and enjoyment," (Id at 179), pursuant thereto that the Utah
Supreme Court contemplates in its concept of an "easement".

(Id

1O

at 179).

Plaintiffs claim the right to the exclusive use and

enjoyment of the entire surface.
alienate,

devise

and

assign

Plaintiffs claim the right to

that

right

of

exclusive

use.

Plaintiffs1 claim the right to profit from the land by leasing
that right of exclusive use to others.

Plaintiffs1 claim the

right to maintain a dwelling on the land and to use the land as
they see fit without regard to the fee owner's interests.

The

sum of the rights claimed by Plaintiffs leaves nothing to the
State that can qualify as a "general ownership".
In short, Plaintiffs1

are seeking ownership of the

property in dispute through a misapplication of the Prescriptive
Easement Doctrine.

The result urged by Plaintiffs has never been

reached by any Court in Utah or the nation.

The granting of such

a prescriptive easement would also subvert adverse possession and
violate the public policy behind the requirement of payment of
taxes so as to put the record owner on notice.

See Bowen v.

Olsen, 2 Utah 2d 12, 268 P.2d 983 (1954).

±J

See also Wycoff v. Barton, 646 P.2d 756, 759 (Utah 1982);
McBride v. McBride, 581 P.2d 996, 997 (Utah 1978); Flying Diamond
v. Rust, 551 P.2d 509, 511 (Utah 1976)
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The cases cited by Plaintiffs in support of their claim
of prescriptive easement are all factually distinguishable and
inapplicable to the instant matter.

Plaintiffs have not cited

a single case which holds for their proposition that an adverse
possessor can gain all of the attributes of ownership through the
doctrine

of prescriptive

easement

if he

fails

to meet

the

requirements for adverse possession.

POINT IX
PLAINTIFFS DID NOT PROPERLY RAISE STATUTES OF
LIMITATIONS, ESTOPPEL AND LACHES
The Utah Supreme Court has declared and held that ffit
is axiomatic that defenses and claims not raised by the parties
in the trial cannot be considered for the first time on appeal.'1
Bangerter v. Poulton, 663 P.2d 100, 102 (Utah 1983)
While

the

special

statute

of

limitations

is

inapplicable for the reason found in Point V of this brief, it is
also important to note that such statute of limitations was never
properly raised.

The general rule is that statute of limitations

must be pleaded pursuant to Rule 8 U.R.C.P. or it is waived. See

Richards v. Pines Ranch, Inc., 559 P.2d 948 is a ruling on
use of - a right-of-way across another1s property. Richins v.
Struhs, 412 P.2d 314, 17 U.2d 35 (1966§0 is a ruling that the
owner of a driveway could not prevent the use of the driveway by
the neighboring owner who had gained prescriptive rights. The
final case cited by Plaintiffs, Zollinger v. Frank, 110 Utah 514,
175 P. 2d 714 (1946) also involved use only of a right-of-way
across another's property.
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Staker v. Huntington Cleveland Irr. Co,, 664 P.2d
1983).

1188 (Utah

The Court has adopted a more liberal standard in Quiet

Title actions which requires, in lieu of pleading the statute of
limitations in situations where no responsive pleading is allowed
to the party asserting statute of limitations, to "do all he
[can] to assert the statute,,f Hansen v, Morris, 3 Utah 2d 310,31,
283 P.2d 884, 887 (1955).
In the instant matter, Plaintiffs did not claim a tax
title in their pleading (Rec. 12-15), and did absolutely nothing
to assert the statute before raising it at the time of trial and
thus should be barred from relying upon it.
In Point V of their brief, Plaintiffs declare that the
State's claim to the subject property is barred by Laches and
Estoppel.

This is the first time Plaintiffs raised Laches and

Estoppel in this matter.

According to Rules 8 and 12 U.R.C.P.,

both Laches and Estoppel are defenses of an affirmative nature
which must be raised no later than the responsive pleading.
Failure to timely raise Laches and Estoppel until the appeal
results in such defenses being forever waived pursuant to Rule
12(h) U.R.C.P.
In Manger v. Davis, 619 P2d 687, 692 (Utah 1980), a
party failed to plead estoppel as required by Rule 8(c) U.R.C.P.
and the Court ruled that the defense of estoppel was waived
pursuant to Rule 12(h) U.R.C.P.
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The result in Manger is not

unique. The Utah Supreme Court has routinely held that the claim
of estoppel could not be considered the first time on appeal.15
While the Utah Court has not had the opportunity to
rule on the precise issue of waiver of laches, it is governed by
the same rules as estoppel and also cannot be raised initially on
appeal.
Thus it is beyond dispute that Plaintiffs1 failure to
timely raise estoppel and laches in response to Defendant's claim
of

ownership

of

the

subject

property

constitutes

waiver

of

estoppel and laches and Plaintiffs cannot raise such defenses for
the first time on appeal.
Even

if,

arguendo,

Plaintiffs

had

properly

raised

laches and estoppel, such doctrines favor Defendants and not
Plaintiffs.

When Park City obtained the subject property by

exchanging property with United Park City Mines Company in 1969,
the Plaintiffs had already abandoned the subject property.

When

Plaintiffs brought this action in 1982, they asserted ownership
by ancient deeds which had no identifiable description and could
not put anyone on notice of any claim to the subject property.
Until Plaintiffs asserted their claim to the subject
property in 1982, Park City and the State had no notice of any
claim and had an unbroken chain of title extending back to
Patent.

It is the Plaintiffs and not the Defendants who should

be barred by

estoppel

and

laches

for delaying

72 years

in

^See Davis v. Barrett, 24 Utah 2d 162, 467 P.2d 603 (1970),
Tanner v. Provo Reservoir~Co., 2 P.2d 107 (1931)
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i

bringing this action.

Defendant State of Utah was the record

holder of the property and thus had no reason to bring any
action.

The delay of Plaintiffs disadvantaged the State.

It is

extremely difficult to defend against an adverse possession claim
when the adverse possession allegedly occurred seventy years ago.

POINT X
PLAINTIFFS DEEDS ARE NULL AND VOID
At the trial, Plaintiffs submitted four deeds through
which they claimed title to the subject property.

A common

element of all of the Plaintiffs deeds is the complete absence of
any locatable description of the property which the deed was
purporting to convey.

The Trial Court specifically found that

the Plaintiff's deeds were void for lack of a description by
which the property

to be conveyed could be located or even

identified. (Rec. 368).
The Trial Court obviously relied on well-settled Utah
law that "a deed must contain a sufficiently definite description
to identify the property it conveys11,
P2d

503, 505

(Utah

1976).

If, after

Colman v. Butkovich, 556
applying

the rules of

construction which are generally applicable to controversies over
the meaning of documents to the deed in question, the Court is
still unable to identify the property the deed is attempting to
convey, then the deed is null and void.
While the Utah Supreme Court has upheld descriptions in
option agreements which identified the property by street address
in Park West Village, Inc. v. Avise, 714 P2d 1137 (Utah 1986);
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and Reed v, Alvey, 610 P2d 1374 (Utah 1980), the descriptions in
the Plaintiffs1 deeds do not contain even a street address to
identify the property.

The opportunity to resort to reasonable

inferences and extrinsic evidence at the trial as prescribed in
Colman, did not yield any clue as to the relationship, if any,
between the property referred to in the deeds and the subject
property.
The absence in Plaintiffs1 deeds of any descriptions to
locate or identify the property to be conveyed makes the instant
matter easily distinguishable from Colman where the commonly used
abbreviations in the legal description was not fatal because
there was "a sound basis for the trial courts conclusion that the
description in the deed was sufficiently definite to convey the
property in question11 (Colman at 505).
The testimony regarding the deeds which was given at
the trial was that the Plaintiffs found the deeds among papers at
their mothers1 or fathers1 homes or among their families1 legal
documents.

(Tr. 34, 36)

No testimony was given which would

relate, in any way, the subject property to the deeds offered by
Plaintiffs.

In Barnard v. Barnard, 700 P2d 1113 (Utah 1985), the

Utah Supreme Court acknowledged that it allowed parol evidence to
fix the location of an ambiguous or uncertain description in an
option

agreement

in Reed v. Alvey, but held

that where no

additional evidence is available such indefinite documents are
void.
It is also important to note the higher standard to
which deeds are held to by the Utah law in contrast with other
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documents such as options.

In Howard v. Howard, 12 Utah 2d 407,

367 P.2d 193, (1962), the Utah Supreme Court held that a warranty
deed was a nullity simply because the description found in the
deed failed to close on the fifth and sixth courses.

The deeds

on which the Plaintiffs1 rely in the instant matter, do not even
contain an identifiable description of real property.

The Court

in Howard held:
Either it is impossible to determine what Howard had in
mind or, conjecture indulged one would have to divine
that any number of areas could be said to have been
intended. In such case, abstractors and lawyers should
be able to turn down a title based on the contentions
of such an illusary intention of a deceased (at 195).
It is clearly beyond dispute that if a deed with a
defective legal description in which Grantors1
reasonably

determinable

Plaintiffs1

deeds

with

is
no

fatally
locatable

intent is not

deficient,
or

then

identifiable

the
legal

descriptions and and no clue as to the Grantors1 intent, are even
more deficient.
The only party to the 1963 Deed (Ex. 7) who testified
is former Summit County Auditor Reed Pace.
was that the deed he executed
improvements

described

only

Mr. Pace's testimony

(Ex. 7) conveyed title to the

and

not

to any

underlying

real

property the improvements may be situated on.

Mr. Pace further

testified

location

that he had no knowledge of

the

of the

improvements referred to in the deed he executed.
The Plaintiffs in the instant matter are asking this
Court to reverse the trial court and ignore the well-founded
requirement in Utah that deeds identify the property they are to
convey, and to rule that the vague and unlocatable descriptions
-37-

in the deeds upon which the Plaintiffs rely are sufficient to
quiet title in the Plaintiffs to the real property described in
their complaint.

This is clearly contrary to settled Utah law.

The rule in Utah, which requires a deed to contain a
description sufficient to identify the property, is well founded
and followed throughout the United States.
Tax Deeds are routinely held to even higher standards
than

inter-party

deeds.

The

New

Mexico

Supreme

Court

in

Brylinski v. Cooper, 624 P. 2d 522 (New Mexico 1981) held that a
stricter test for the description of a tax deed is applied.

The

reason for the stricter test is that tax deeds must give notice
to

the

foreclosed

owner

and

the

public

of what

particular

property is being conveyed.

POINT XI
THE TITLE OF THE STATE IS THE SUPERIOR TITLE

If, arguendo, the Plaintiffs deeds were deemed to be
valid, the chain of title through which the Defendant State of
Utah claims the subject real property is still clearly the

See Boone v. Pritchett, 130 Se.2d 288 (North Carolina
1963); MacKuEbTn v. Rosedale Memorial Park, Inc., 198 A.2d 856
(Pennsylvania 1964); See also 4 Tiffany, Real Property, 3rd Ed.
Sec. 990
17

See also Wingard v. Heinkel, 424 P.2d 1010 (Wash. 1967)
and Yetter v. Gallitln County, 645 P.2d 941 (Mont. 1982)
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superior chain of title.
indeed curious.

Plaintiffs claim of a chain of title is

The Plaintiffs1 deeds are a quit claim deed from

McPolin to McCarrel (Ex. 4), a quit claim deed from Summit County
to a William Rolph (Ex. 5), a quit claim deed from Summit County
to a William Rolfe (Ex. 6), and a tax deed from Summit County to
Charles Rolfe

(Ex. 7).

There are no deeds from any of the

Grantees to any other Grantee, and none from any Grantee to any
of the Plaintiffs.

There are simply four disconnected deeds upon

which the Trial Court ruled that the chain of title of Plaintiffs
was discontinuous.

(Rec. 368)

In contrast, the paper chain of title of the State is an
unbroken chain back to the original source, the Patent issued by
Chester A. Arthur as President of the United States.

This is a

complete and perfect chain of title as defined by the Utah
Supreme Court and no proof of actual possession is needed.

In

Music Service Corporation v. Walton, 432 P.2d 334, 20 Utah 2d 16
(1967) the Utah Supreme Court cited with approval Cottrell v.
Pickering, 32 Utah 62, 88 P. 696 (1907) and held that:

"Of

course, where one proves a perfect chain of paper title from its
original source, no proof of actual possession is required. In
such event the presumption would be all sufficient and the title
would be a complete and perfect title11 (at 336).
The

only

expert

title

abstractor who

testified at

Trial, Nick Butkovich, testified that State's chain of title was
superior to Plaintiffs1.
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Plaintiffs have attacked the State's chain of title
because two of the seven links in the chain (Ex. 28, 29, 30), 1 8
contain general grant or "Mother Hubbard" descriptions rather
than a metes and bounds description of the subject property,
"'Mother Hubbard1 descriptions purporting to convey all of the
Grantor's land or all land situate in a certain area have been
19
repeatedly upheld."
A recent case example of a "Mother
Hubbard" description being upheld is Luthi v. Evans, 576 P. 2d
1064 (Kan. 1978).
because

the

Such descriptions are not void for uncertainty

property

referred

to

by

the

"Mother

Hubbard"

description can be determined from previous of-record conveyances
to the Grantor.
Finally,

Plaintiffs

claim

of

a

chain

of

title is

further barred by an attempt to claim tax deed(s) as part of
their chain of title.

It is settled Utah law that a tax deed

either adds nothing to title if the tax deed is obtained by the
party who actually owed the taxes, or creates a new title if the
tax deed is obtained by a third party who had no duty to pay
taxes.
This rule of law is set forth in Dillman v. Foster, 656
P. 2d 974 (Utah 1982) and Tuft v. Federal Leasing, 657 P.2d 1300
(Utah 1982).

Two of the deeds (Ex. 29 and 30) are deeds from each of
two tenants in common and therefore represent only a single link
in the chain.
19

Thompson on Real Property, 1962 Repl. Vol. 6 3023 pg. 453
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POINT XII
SEPARATE TAXATION & FORFEITURE OF REAL PROPERTY
AND IMPROVEMENTS IS ULTRA VIRES AND DEEDS SO ISSUED
ARE VOID
The practice of Summit County to separately assess and tax
improvements from the real property upon which the improvements
were constructed if there is separate ownership, was recognized
by this Court in Parkwest Village v. Avise, 714 P.2d 1137 (Utah
1986).

In the trial of the instant matter, this practice was

testified to at length by retired Summit County Official Reed
Pace and Deputy County Assessor Steven Martin.
Plaintiffs have correctly pointed out that the practice
of Summit County separately assessing, foreclosing and selling
for non-payment of taxes, improvements to real property was not
sanctioned by State Law.
since

this

conclude

practice was

that

any

tax

However, Plaintiffs then contend that
ultra-vires
deed

issued

that

this

by

Summit

Court

should

County

for

improvements only passes title to the underlying real property.
Such a conclusion is prohibited by controlling constitutional
law.
Rather

than

giving

the

broad

construction

to

the

ultra-vires acts of Summit County in tax assessment, foreclosure
and sale, this Court has uniformly held that tax assessment,
foreclosure and sale should be strictly and narrowly construed.
In Frederickson v. La Fleur, 632 P2d 827, 828

(Utah 1987),

Justice Oaks wrote:
American courts have long looked upon tax titles
with a jaundiced eye. Like the courts of most
other States, this Court has consistently held
that statutes providing for the sale of tax
-41-

delinquent lands and the issuance of tax deeds
pursuant to such sales are to be construed
narrowly and in favor of the tax debtor.
Not only are such activities to be construed narrowly
and strictly, but other jurisdictions which, unlike Utah, have
had the opportunity to rule, have consistently ruled that a tax
deed or any subsequent conveyance to a tax deed can only convey
that property which was assessed and obtained for non-payment of
taxes.

In Webermeier v. Pace, 552 P2d 1021, 1024 (Colo 1976),

the Colorado Court of Appeals held that "the grantee of a tax
deed secures title to no more than that owned by the Grantee's
predecessor in title11.
The Colorado Court of Appeals in Webermeier had the
opportunity to rule on a similar issue to the instant matter.

In

Webermeier, A person only owned the mineral rights to coal in a
certain parcel of real property. This person's ownership rights
were foreclosed for non-payment of taxes and a deed was issued by
the County after tax sale, which purported to convey all mineral
rights.

The Court held that the deed only conveyed ownership

rights in coal since the County had only obtained the mineral
rights to coal through the tax foreclosure and could only convey
what it had obtained. The ownership of the other mineral interest
holders could not be disturbed and grantees of the tax deeds had
no

claim

to

other

mineral

interests,

regardless

of

the

See also Mecham v. Mel-0-Tone Enterprises, Inc., 23 Utah
2d 402, 464 P.2d 392 (1970) and Salt Lake Home Builders, Inc., v.
Colman, 518 P.2d 165 (Utah 1974)
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description of the tax deed.

The Utah Court in Hayes v. Gibbs,

110 Utah 54, 169 P.2d 731 (1946) held that only the interest that
is properly

assessed is sold at a tax sale.

The same rule

applies to the Plaintiffs quit claim deeds (Ex. 4, 5, 6). In
Johnson v. Bell, 666 P.2d 308 (Utah 1983), the Court held that a
grantee under a quit claim deed acquires only the interest of the
grantor.

Thus, it is beyond dispute that the Plaintiffs deeds at

most conveyed the improvements only and no real property.
At most

Plaintiffs1

tax deed and quit claim deeds

conveyed only improvements, since that was the only ownership
interest obtained by the County through tax foreclosure.

Such

deeds could not disturb the ownership of the underlying real
property.

Because

such

taxation,

foreclosure

and

sale

of

improvements was an ultra vires act, the tax deed and quit claim
deeds

issued

improvements
absolutely

subsequent

to

the

may well be void.
cannot

be

broadly

tax

foreclosure

In any

construed

event,
now

to

such

of

the

action

include

the

underlying real property.
The public policy underlying

the narrow and strict

construction of the forfeiture of the property through the tax
foreclosure and sale process is grounded in the Constitutional
Prohibition against taking of property without due process of
law.

Courts around the country have uniformly held that in order

to divest an owner of property through tax foreclosure, the owner
must be given actual notice prior to the proceeding and the
notice must contain a sufficient description of the property
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being foreclosed to identify and locate it,
description is discussed in Section X ) .

(Sufficiency of

91

Strict and narrow construction of all tax foreclosures
and sale proceedings is also demanded by the Fifth Amendment to
the United

States

Constitution, which

is made applicable to

actions by the States by the Foruteenth Amendment and by Article
1, Section 1 of the Constitution of Utah, which both guarantee
due process of law, before depravation of property.
In 1983, the United

States

Supreme Court ruled in

Mennonite Board of Missions v, Adams, 462 U. S. 791 (1983) that
not only must owners receive actual notice of impending tax
foreclosure, but due process demands that all lienholders also be
given actual notice.
In the instant action, Plaintiffs would have this Court
construe a 1963 tax deed issued by Summit County for a house in
lumber yard to include the subject real property even though the
then

owner, United

Park

City

Mines

Company,

paid

all

real

property taxes both before and after the tax sale and obviously
had no knowledge of any foreclosure affecting their ownership.
The result urged by Plaintiffs would clearly violate
the Due Process of Law.

The Utah Court has also held that a

purported sale for taxes when taxes were not delinquent was void

See Wenatachee Reclamation District v. Mustell, 665 P. 2d
909 (Wash. App. 1983); Wingard v. Heinkel, 424 P.2d 1010 (Wash.
1967); Yetter v. Gallatin County, 645 P.2d 941 (Mont. 1982)
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and conveyed no interest whatsoever to purchasers in Mecham v.
Mel-O-Tone Enterprises, Inc., 23 Utah 2d 403, 464 P2d 392 (1970).

POINT XIII
ADVERSE POSSESSION DOES NOT
OPERATE AGAINST
POLITICAL SUBDIVISIONS OF THE STATE
Even if Plaintiffs had been able to prove adverse
possession, their window of opportunity for Adverse Possession to
ripen closed April 2, 1969.

On this date Park City, a political

subdivision of the State of Utah, obtained the subject property
by

deed.

The

public

policy

prohibiting

adverse

possession

against political subdivisions of the State is codified in §
78-12-13, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended, which states:
No person shall be allowed to acquire any right or
title in or to any lands held by any town, city or
county, or the corporate authorities thereof,
designated for public use as streets, lanes, avenues,
alleys, parks or public squares, or for any other
public purpose, by adverse possession thereof
for any length of time whatsoever,...
Public purpose is defined throughout the country very
broadly

as

any

activity

which

promotes

health,

safety

and

welfare.
Pursuant to § 10-8-2, Utah Code Annotated, the City
Council of Park City

determines what activities promote the

health, safety, and welfare, and Park City may purchase property,

See Anderson y. Baehr, 217 SE2d 43, 47 (S. Car. 1975);
Clifford v. City of CheyenneT487 P.2d 1325 (Wyo. 1971); Kearney
v. City of Schenectady 325 NYS2d 278, 280 (N.Y. 1971)
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and hold property only

if the purchase and holding of such

property will promote health, safety, and welfare.

Thus, State

law allows Park City to determine what public purposes are, and
only buy and hold property if it promotes a public purpose.
When the City Council of Park City obtained the subject
property from United Park City Mines Company in 1969, such action
is presumed to be an action promoting a public purpose.

The

holding of the subject property is also presumed to be promoting
a public purpose.

McQuillan on Municipal Corporations 3rd Ed.

Revised 1981 § 28.11 pg. 23 states:

"However, in the absence of

a contrary provision, ordinarily it will be presumed that lands
purchased by a municipal corporation were purchased for a purpose
authorized by law."
No evidence was admitted at trial which would rebut the
presumption that the property was acquired and held for a public
purpose.

The property is now a part of Utah State Highway 224,

and is still serving a public purpose.
Although its inapplicability to the instant matter is
discussed in Point VIII, the doctrine of prescriptive easement,
like adverse possession, is unavailable against the State and its
political

subdivisions.

The Utah

Supreme court held

that a

private individual could not obtain a prescriptive easement in a
public roadway in Thurman v. Byram, 626 P.2d 447 (Utah 1981).
POINT IV
PARK CITY IS NOT LIABLE FOR DESTRUCTION OF SHACK
Plaintiffs claim for damages for the destruction of the
shack

is

so

weak

that

it

barely
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merits

response.

It

is

elementary tort law that a person is not liable for the actions
of

a

third

person

actin

independently.

Plaintiffs, without

authority, contend that Park City should be held liable for the
actions of a third party in demolishing the shack.
The evidence adduced at trial was clearly that the
shack was demolished by a third party in connection with the
construction of a waterline by the Deer Valley Resort.

Park City

did not participate in the demolition in any way except to issue
a demolition permit.

The building official who issued the permit

believed that Deer Valley had the right to demolish the shack and
a

contractor

for Deer

Valley

obtained

the

permit

(Ex.

38)

representing in writing that it had such right.
It is well founded and univerally accepted law that a
municipality has no liability if a permit is issued erroneously
to one who is not the owner.

The New York Court of Appeals held

in Rolfe v. Village of Falconer, 467 N. E. 2d 516 (N. Y. App.
1984) held; that the Village could not be held liable for damages
or theft by a person who represented himself as the owner &
obtained a building permit.
CONCLUSION
Like the proverbial ship in a storm which seeks any
port, Plaintiffs have sought the subject property by any theory.
This shotgun approach was undoubtedly precipitated by Plaintiffs1
realization that they have no single valid claim to the subject
property, and hope to patch together bits and pieces of various
theories to obtain the subject property.
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The Trial Court considered Plaintiffs' claim of title,
their four disconnected and faulty deeds, none of which have an
identifiable description of the property

to be conveyed, and

ruled that the State's unbroken chain of title extending back to
Patent was superior.
The Plaintiffs then contended that the State's title
had been undermined by adverse possession.

However, adverse

possession requires that the adverse possessor prove payment of
all taxes for a seven year period.

Plaintiffs could only show

payment of taxes for three years at most, while the State's
predecessor paid taxes every year from 1931 to 1969.
possessor must also hold the property adversely
owner.

An adverse

to the true

The evidence adduced at trial was that the use of the

subject property by Plaintiffs' predecessors was permissive and
not adverse.

Finally, to bring an action for adverse possession,

the adverse possessor must possess the property during the seven
year period prior to bringing the action, while the Plaintiffs
had abandoned the property over twenty years earlier.

Clearly

Plaintiffs

adverse

cannot

obtain

the

subject

property

by

possession.
Alternatively, Plaintiffs claimed all of the attributes
of ownership through prescriptive easement.

This claim is a

novel one, and would so blur the distinction between use and
ownership
ownership.

as to make an easement

indistinguishable

from fee

Unfortunately for Plaintiffs, there is no authority

for this position, not only in Utah but throughout the nation.
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Plaintiffs1

faulty

adverse

possession

claim,

cannot

be

rehabilitated by changing its title to prescriptive easement.
The Plaintiffs

then seek to shield their defective

title with the statues of limitations afforded to purchasers of
tax titles.

This argument fails in multiple respects.

First,

the deeds Plaintiffs seek to shield are for improvements only and
not

for

the

subject

property.

Second,

the

Plaintiffs1

predecessor purposely failed to pay taxes on the improvements in
order to "boot strap11 themselves a title.

Such attempts in

creating title out of thin air were declared futile in Dillman v.
Foster, 656 P.2d 974, 980 (Utah 1982)

Third, the deeds have no

identifiable description and cannot be related to the subject
property.
Finally, the Plaintiffs seek repayment from Park City
for

the destruction

of an abandoned

shack when all of the

evidence was that a third party demolished the shack to make was
for a water line to its property.

Once again, Plaintiffs are

seeking to fashion a cause of action where none exists.
It is clear that the Trial Court correctly ruled in
dismissing every count of Plaintiffs1 complaint.The Plaintiffs
have no rights to the subject property and the well-thought and
reasoned ruling of the Trial Court should be affirmed.

Respectfully submitted this

|*

day of

ugCgfribg^

Assistant uity Attorney
Attorney for Respondent
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> 1987.

nieixpal Corporation

nan
sistant Attorney General
Attorney for Respondent
State of Utah

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
This is to certify that four copies of the foregoing
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT PARK CITY, A MUNICIPAL CORPORATION AND THE
STATE OF UTAH were mailed, postage prepaid, this 9th day of
December, 1987, to the following:
Robert Felton
310 South Main Street, Suite 1309
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
J. Craig Smith
Marchant3/PLEAD6
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ADDENDUM

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

VELMA MARCHANT, et al.,

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Plaintiffs,

CIVIL NO. 7174

vs.
PARK CITY, a Municipal
corporation, JACK COPPEDGE,
and the STATE OF UTAH,
Defendants.

The above case was tried, commencing May 6, 1987.

The

Court received evidence by way of testimony, exhibit, and stipulation, and after hearing final arguments of counsel, took the
matter under advisement.

The Court has now reviewed the evidence

and law in this matter, and renders its Memorandum Decision
as follows:
1.

The defendants' title to the underlying property in

question, even with the claimed Michigan Trust Company gap,
is superior to the title line claimed by the plaintiffs.

The

defendants1 title is traceable to the patent of the United States
Government.

Plaintiffs1 title is insufficient in description

and continuity. The plaintiff does not have title to the underlying
property.

Plaintiffs' title, if any, was to the house or improve-

ments on the underlying property.

MARCHANT V. PARK CITY

2.

PAGE TWO

MEMORANDUM DECISION

The underlying property in question was owned by the

mining company, who allowed certain miners to build houses on
the said property.

Summit County assessed taxes against the

underlying property separately from against the improvements
thereon.

If the owner of the improvements (house) failed to

pay taxes, legal process eventually led to a tax sale only as
to that improvement.

Anyone who purchased at the tax sale acquired

only that property that had been so assessed and levied against.
3.

The various tax deeds did not give plaintiffs • predecessors

more than they already had.
4.

Plaintiffs • predecessors never paid taxes on the underlying

property, but only on that which had been assessed against them,
the improvements.
5.

The defendants' predecessors paid all assessed taxes

on the underlying property.
6.

The plaintiffs1 predecessors did not obtain the underlying

property by adverse possession, since they never paid taxes
on the same, and did not hold the same adversely against the
true owner who did pay taxes on the said property.
7.

The plaintiffs did not obtain the underlying property

by adverse possession, since such cannot be had against a political
subdivision of the State of Utah.

In any case, they did not

have possession for more than seven years before filing of the
Complaint, they did not pay all assessed taxes on the property

MARCHANT V. PARK CITY
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MEMORANDUM DECISION

in question, and their claims are barred by the statute of limitations.
8.

For more than seven years prior to the filing of the

Complaint, the property in question was not possessed by plaintiffs,
rather it was abandoned.
a state of deterioration.

It was empty and open.

It was in

Those rare visits claimed by defendant

did not constitute possession.
9.

The tax deeds conveyed only the house and not the

underlying property.
10.

Prescriptive easement is not applicable, inasmuch

as it applies only to use, and not to title claims to the fee
simple.
11.

The house which had been owned by plaintiffs1 predecessors

was removed or demolished by a third party, not a party to this
legal action. Because the house was abandoned, open, and considered
a nuisance, Park City demanded of owners to abate the same.
On application for permit, Park City granted such permit allowing
demolition of the house.

Park City did not participate in de-

struction of the house, and cannot be liable thereof.
12.

The granting of a demolition permit by Park City to

a contractor, based on proper application, does not impose liability
on Park City if the permit was wrongfully obtained or the work
therein unlawfully performed.

MARCHANT V. PARK CITY
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MEMORANDUM DECISION

Plaintiffs make no claim against the State of Utah

for removal or destruction of the house.
14.

Even if plaintiffs had established liability on a

party hereto for destruction of the house in question, the evidence
of such damage is insufficient for an award to be made.

There

was no evidence presented as to the value of this old building,
and no finding could be made without gross speculation in regards
thereto.
15.

Furthermore, the plaintiffs' claims are barred by

the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, Section 63-30-1, et seq.
No notices of claim were filed within one year after the claim
arose as required by that Act.

The plaintiffs were aware of

the destroyed building prior to Labor Day 1981.
claim was ever filed against the State of Utah.

No notice of

Notice of claim

was filed against Park City on September 20, 1982, more than
one year after the plaintiffs learned of the destruction of
the building.

The very latest the claim could arise was at

that time.
16.

Title to the land in question is quieted in the defen-

dants (State of Utah).

Plaintiffs are not entitled to damages

against these defendants.
Attorney for the defendant Park City will prepare the appropriate Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Judgment, and

MARCHANT V. PARK CITY
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submit the same to plaintiffs' attorney for approval as to form
before submitting them to the Court for final signature.
Dated this <£cK day of May, 1987.

/Si

Leonard-

l4.£usson

LEONARD H. RUSSON
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

MARCHANT V. PARK CITY
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MEMORANDUM DECISION

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy
of the foregoing Memorandum Decision, postage prepaid, to the
following, this

day of May, 1987:

Robert Felton
Attorney for Plaintiffs
5 Triad Center, Suite 585
Salt Lake City, Utah 84180
J. Craig Smith
James W. Carter
Attorneys for Defendant Park City
445 Marsac Avenue
P.O. Box 1480
Park City, Utah 84060
Allen Backman
Assistant Attorney General
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Ut 84114

J. CRAIG SMITH, #4143
JAMES W. CARTER, #0586
Park City Municipal Corporation
445 Marsac Avenue
P.O. Box 1480
Park City, Utah 84060
Telephone: (801)649-9321
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT OF
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

VELMA MARCHANT, et al.
Plaintiffs,

i
;

v.

]

PARK CITY, a municipal
corporation, JACK
COPPEDGE, and the STATE
OF UTAH,
Defendants.

Civil No. 7174
;
]I Honorable Leonard H. Russon
]
]
]

JUDGMENT

This matter came regularly for Trial on May 6, 1987
before the Court, the Honorable Leonard H. Russon presiding,
the Trial concluded on May 7, 1987, after all parties had
fully presented all evidence and argued their respective
positions.

The

parties

appeared

through,

and

were

represented by, their respective counsel, J. Craig Smith,
Esq., Assistant City Attorney, and James W. Carter, Esq.,
City

Attorney,

for

Defendant

Park

City

Municipal

Corporation, Alan Bachman, Esq., Assistant Attorney General

for Defendant State of Utah, and Robert Felton, Esq., for
Plaintiffs, Velma Marchant, Leora Robinson, Wanda

Penrod,

Mona Liechty and Merle R. Anderson.

Evidence was received in the form of testimony, exhibit
and stipulation, oral argument
made

by

respective

counsel

on the facts and law were
and

legal

memoranda

were

submitted.

Having

given

full

admitted,

the

legal

argument

made,

the

consideration

memoranda
Court

to

submitted,

having

entered

the
and
a

evidence
the

oral

Memorandum

Decision and entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law does hereby Order, Adjudge and Decree as follows:

1.

Plaintiff's Complaint, and each cause thereof, is

dismissed with prejudice.

2.

Fee ownership of the real property

in question,

which is particularly described as:
Beginning at a point which is North 407.38 feet West
41.39 feet of the Southwest corner of the Southeast
one-quarter of the Northeast one-quarter Section 16,
Township 2 South, Range 4 East, Salt Lake Base and
Meridian thence North 36°40f9ff West 71.46 feet; thence
North 57°29 , 15" East 77.50 feet; thence South 18°58l45,f
East 70.93 feet; thence South 55°6f25ff West 55.77 feet
to the point of beginning.
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is quieted in the State of Utah free of any interest, lien,
easement, or encumbrance of Plaintiffs.

3.

Each party is to bear its own attorney's fees and

costs of court.

4.

This is a final and appealable judgment.

1

v^
DATED t h i s _£

day of 4wt^T 1987.
BY THE COURT

y ttmtv h tttlk
Leonard H. Russon
District Court Judge
Approved as to Form:

1 Crai^Smi«-/Esq.
& ttorntfy^or Defendant
Park City Municipal Corporation

Aran Bachman, Esq.
Attorney for Defendant
Stafc^ o / Uta^

mm/\Felton*
Attorney for

ts<\.
Plaintiffs
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)

J. CRAIG SMITH, #4143
JAMES W. CARTER, #0586
Park City Municipal Corporation
445 Marsac Avenue
P.O. Box 1480
Park City, Utah 84060
Telephone: (801)649-9321
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT OF
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

VELMA MARCHANT, et al.
Plaintiffs,

]
]

v.

)
])

PARK CITY, a municipal
corporation, JACK
COPPEDGE, and the STATE
OF UTAH,
Defendants.

>
Civil No. 7174
]
]> Honorable Leonard H. Russon
]
;
]

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

This matter came on regularly for Trial on May 6, 1987
before the Court, the Honorable Leonard H. Russon, District
Judge

presiding.

represented

by

Esq., Assistant

The

their

parties

appeared

respective

City Attorney

through

counsel, J.

and

Craig

were

Smith,

and James W. Carter, Esq.,

City Attorney for Defendant Park City Municipal Corporation,
Alan Bachman, Esq., Assistant Attorney General for Defendant
State of Utah and Robert Felton, Esq., for the Plaintiffs,

Velma Marchant, Leora Robinson, Wanda Penrod, Mona Liechty
and Merle R. Anderson.
At

the Trial

testimony,

exhibit

the Court
and

received

stipulation

evidence

and heard

by way

of

argument by

counsel representing the respective parties.
Having given full consideration to all of the testimony
heard and evidence admitted and having reviewed the legal
memoranda

and

heard

the

oral

argument,

and

now

being

appraised as to all and singularly the law and the facts of
the matter, the Court herewith makes and enters its:

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The

real

property

in

question

which

was

the

subject of this action is described as follows:
Beginning at a point which is North 407.38 feet West
41 • 39 feet of the Southwest corner of the Southeast
one-quarter of the Northeast one-quarter Section 16,
Township 2 South, Range 4 East, Salt Lake Base and
Meridian thence North 36°40f9,f West 71.46 feet; thence
North 57°29,15" East 77.50 feet; thence South 18°58'45,f
East 70.93 feet; thence South 55°6f25fl West 55.77 feet
to the point of beginning.
2.

The chain of title through which Defendant State

of Utah claims title to the real property
traceable

to

the

patent

derived

from

in question is

the

United

States

Government.
3.

The real property in question was previously owned

by Silver King Coalition Mines Company.
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It was a common

practice for Silver King Coalition Mines Company to allow
miners to construct houses on real property

the Company

owned.
4.

Plaintiffs1

predecessors

in interest worked for

Silver King Coalition Mines Company and were permitted to
construct a house on the real property in question.
5.

The

underlying

real

property

in

question

was

assessed by Summit County separately from the house located
thereon claimed by Plaintiffs.
6.

Defendant's predecessors in interest paid all real

property taxes assessed against the underlying real property
in question.
7.

Neither

Plaintiffs

nor

their

predecessors

in

interest paid any taxes on the underlying real property in
question.
8.

Plaintiffs did not have possession of the real

property in question for a period in excess of seven years
prior to filing their complaint; it was abandoned, empty and
open and in a state of deterioration and was rarely visited
by Plaintiffs.
9.

The chain of title through which Plaintiffs claim

title to the real property in question is discontinuous.
10.
were

The tax deeds through which Plaintiffs claim title

given

by

Summit

County

pursuant

to

unpaid

tax

delinquencies on the improvements located on the underlying
real property in question.
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The house which had been owned by Plaintiffs1

11.

predecessors was removed or demolished by a third party, not
a party to this action.
12.

Because of the abandoned and deteriorated nature

of the house on the property Park City granted a demolition
permit

for

the

demolition

of

the

house,

on

proper

application, to a third party claiming ownership of the
house.
13.

There was no evidence presented as to the value of

the house and no finding as to the value can be made without
gross speculation.
14.

Plaintiffs were aware of the destruction of the

house prior to September 7, 1981.
15.

No

notice

of

claim

was

ever

filed

by

the

Plaintiffs against Defendant State of Utah.
16.

Notice of claim was filed against Defendant Park

City on September 20, 1982, more than one year after the
Plaintiffs learned of the destruction of the house.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The chain of title through which the Defendant

State of Utah claims title is superior to the chain of title
through which Plaintiffs claim title.
2.
underlying

Plaintiffs1
real

claim

property

insufficient descriptions

to
in

title

by

question,

deed
fails

to

the

due

to

in the claimed deeds and a lack
-*-

of

continuity

Plaintiffs1

of

claimed

chain

of

title.

Plaintiffs1 title, if any, was to the house or improvements
located upon the real property in question.
3.

The tax deeds under which Plaintiffs claim title

to the real property conveyed improvements only and had no
effect on title to the underlying real property in question.
4.

The tax deeds under which Plaintiffs claim title

to the underlying real property in question add nothing to
the title of the Plaintiffs'.
5.

Adverse possession cannot be had against Defendant

Park City, a political subdivision of the State of Utah, or
against

Defendant

State

of

Utah

pursuant

to

Utah

Code

Annotated § 78-12-13, 1953 as amended.
6.

Plaintiffs' claim of title to the real property in

question

by

adverse

prescription

are

possession

barred

by

and

the

claim

of

easement

by

applicable

statute

of

limitations pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 78-12-5, 1953
as amended.
7.
barred

Plaintiffs'
by

claim

Plaintiffs'

Governmental

Immunity

against

failure

to

the

State

comply

of Utah is

with

the

Utah

Act, Utah Code Annotated

§ 63-30-1,

claims

Park

et. seq.
8.

Plaintiffs'

against

Defendant

City

Municipal Corporation are barred by Plaintiffs' failure to
comply with the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, Utah Code
Annotated § 63-30-1, et. seq.
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Plaintiffs1

9.
real

property

in

claim

question

of

adverse

fails,

possession

pursuant

to

of

Utah

the
Code

Annotated § 78-12-12, 1953 as amended, for failing to show
payment of all taxes which have been levied and assessed
upon the real property in question according to law.
10.

Plaintiffs' claims of adverse possession of the

real property in question and of prescriptive easement fail
since possession by Plaintiffs1 predecessors in interest was
not adverse to the interests of Defendants1 predecessors in
interest.
11.
entire

Plaintiffs' claim of prescriptive easement to the
area

of

the

real

property

in

question

fails

as

inapplicable to the facts of the case and concerns only use
rather than possession of or title to real property.
12.
for

Defendant

issuing

application,
wrongfully

a

Park City is not
demolition

notwithstanding
obtained

or

the

liable

permit,

to Plaintiffs

based

whether

on

the

demolition

proper

permit

work

was

unlawfully

performed.
13.

Plaintiffs have stated no claim against the State

of Utah for the destruction of the house.
14.

Plaintiffs'

complaint,

and

each

cause

thereof,

should be dismissed with prejudice and title to the real
property in question should be quieted in the State of Utah
free

and

clear

of

any

interest,

encumbrance by Plaintiffs.
-6-

lien,

easement,

or

15.

Plaintiffs are not entitled to any damages against

Defendants.

Wherefore,
Defendants

let judgment

and against

be entered

the Plaintiffs

in favor

in accordance

these findings of fact and conclusions of law.

Dated this

(pik

day of June, 1987

By the Court

s/fy^er
Leonard H. Russon
District Court Judge
Approved as to form:

Cr

££fe Sfhith, Esq.
ttomey for Defendant
Park City Municipal Corporation

liU^

LUJLAA^

Alani Bachman, Esq.
Attorryav/for J)efendant^
Statjg/oxUtc

>ert F e l t o n ,
Attorney for P l a i n t i f f s
M53
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of the
with

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of
the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and Judgment,
postage prepaid, to the following individual on the
th
day of June, 1987:
Alan Bachman, Esq.
236 State Capital
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Robert M. Felton, Esq.
5 Triad Center, Suite 585
Salt Lake City, Utah 84180
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AMENDMENTS
TO THE

CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES

AMENDMENT V
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except
in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in
actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person
be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb;
nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation.

AMENDMENT XIV
Section 1.
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States;
nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.

CONSTITUTION OF UTAH

ART.

I, § 7

Sec. 7. [Due process of law.]
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due
process of law.

CHAPTER 30
GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT

63-30-12. Claim against state or its employee — Time for
filing notice.
A claim against the state or its employee for an act or omission occurring
during the performance of his duties, within the scope of employment, or
under color of authority, is barred unless notice of claim is filed with the
attorney general and the agency concerned within one year after the claim
arises, or before the expiration of any extension of time granted under Subsection 63-30-11(4).

PART III.
PLEADINGS, MOTIONS, AND ORDERS.

Rule 8. General rules of pleadings.
(c) Affirmative defenses. In pleading to a preceding pleading, a party
shall set forth affirmatively accord and satisfaction, arbitration and award,
assumption of risk, contributory negligence, discharge in bankruptcy, duress,
estoppel, failure of consideration, fraud, illegality, injury by fellow servant,
laches, license, payment, release, res judicata, statute of frauds, statute of
limitations, waiver, and any other matter constituting an avoidance of affirmative defense. When a party has mistakenly designated a defense as a counterclaim or a counterclaim as a defense, the court on terms, if justice so
requires, shall treat the pleadings as if there had been a proper designation.

Rule 12. Defenses and objections.
(h) Waiver of defenses. A party waives all defenses and objections which
he does not present either by motion as hereinbefore provided or, if he has
made no motion, in his answer or reply, except (1) that the defense of failure
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, the defense of failure to join
an indispensable party, and the objection of failure to state a legal defense to a
claim may also be made by a later pleading, if one is permitted, or by motion
for judgment on the pleadings or at the trial on the merits, and except (2) that,
whenever it appears by suggestion of the parties or otherwise that the court
lacks jurisdiction of the subject-matter, the court shall dismiss the action. The
objection or defense, if made at the trial, shall be disposed of as provided in
Rule 15(b) in the light of any evidence that may have been received.

CHAPTER 12
LIMITATION OF ACTIONS
78-12-5. Seizure or possession within seven years necessary.
No action for the recovery of real property or for the possession thereof shall
be maintained, unless it appears that the plaintiff, his ancestor, grantor or
predecessor was seized or possessed of the property in question within seven
years before the commencement of the action.

78-12-7. Adverse possession — Possession presumed in
owner.
In every action for the recovery of real property, or the possession thereof,
the person establishing a legal title to the property shall be presumed to have
been possessed thereof within the time required by law; and the occupation of
the property by any other person shall be deemed to have been under and in
subordination to the legal title, unless it appears that the property has been
held and possessed adversely to such legal title for seven years before the
commencement of the action.

78-12-9. What constitutes adverse possession under written instrument.
For the purpose of constituting an adverse possession by any person claiming a title founded upon a written instrument or a judgment or decree, land is
deemed to have been possessed and occupied in the following cases:
(1) where it has been usually cultivated or improved.
(2) where it has been protected by a substantial inclosure.
(3) where, although not inclosed, it has been used for the supply of fuel,
or of fencing timber, for the purpose of husbandry, or for pasturage or for
the ordinary use of the occupant.
(4) where a known farm or single lot has been partly improved, the
portion of such farm or lot that may have been left not cleared or not
inclosed according to the usual course and custom of the adjoining county
is deemed to have been occupied for the same length of time as the part
improved and cultivated.

78-12-10. Under claim not founded on written instrument
or judgment.
Where it appears that there has been an actual continued occupation of land
under claim of title, exclusive of any other right, but not founded upon a
written instrument, judgment or decree, the land so actually occupied, and no
other, is deemed to have been held adversely.

LIMITATION OF ACTIONS

7g.l2-ll- What constitutes adverse possession not under
written instrument.
For the purpose of constituting an adverse possession by a person claiming
tie not founded upon a written instrument, judgment or decree, land is
deemed to have been possessed and occupied in the following cases only:
(1) where it has been protected by a substantial inclosure.
(2) where it has been usually cultivated or improved.
(3) where labor or money has been expended upon dams, canals, embankments, aqueducts or otherwise for the purpose of irrigating such
lands amounting to the sum of $5 per acre.

78-12-13. Adverse possession of public streets or ways.
No person shall be allowed to acquire any right or title in or to any lands
held by any town, city or county, or the corporate authorities thereof, designated for public use as streets, lanes, avenues, alleys, parks or public squares,
or for any other public purpose, by adverse possession thereof for any length of
time whatsoever, unless it shall affirmatively appear that such town or city or
county or the corporate authorities thereof have sold, or otherwise disposed of,
and conveyed such real estate to a purchaser for a valuable consideration, and
that for more than seven years subsequent to such conveyance the purchaser,
his grantees or successors in interest, have been in the exclusive, continuous
and adverse possession of such real estate; in which case an adverse title may
be acquired.

78-12-12. Possession must be continuous, and taxes paid.
In no case shall adverse possession be considered established under the
provisions of any section of this code, unless it shall be shown that the land
has been occupied and claimed for the period of seven years continuously, and
that the party, his predecessors and grantors have paid all taxes which have
been levied and assessed upon such land according to law.

